Combating bioterrorism calls for a comprehensive biological security approach
The anthrax attacks last fall make it clear that the United States needs
"a comprehensive approach" to biological security, said Christopher
Chyba, co-director of Stanford University’s Center for International
Security and Cooperation, in a Director’s Distinguished Lecturer
Series presentation.
Chyba said the attacks in Tokyo by the Aum Shinrikyo cult were earlier
evidence that "attempted mass biological attacks are within the realm
of possibility."
Prior to the more highly publicized sarin gas attack in the Tokyo subway,
the cult had attempted to spread anthrax in the city but used the wrong
strain. "I don’t know if we should take comfort in that,"
he said, noting the perpetrators were sophisticated "but failed technically."
Chyba warned that because of the special challenges biological weapons
pose, a different strategy is needed from that used to combat the threat
of nuclear or chemical weapons. "Our minds are too easily captured
by misplaced analogies to nuclear weapons," he said. "We tend
to group the nuclear, biological and chemical."
The biological threat is, in one sense, more analogous to cyberterrorism
because it is more diffuse. "There are over 100 million computers
in the world with access to the Internet and the number is growing daily,"
Chyba said. Likewise "biological weapons materials are present in
many facilities around the world. As biotechnology spreads around the
world, the ability to do nefarious things will become more common. The
biotechnology revolution is rolling around the world and there’s
nothing that can stop that."
In contrast, nuclear weapons production requires large, complex facilities.
"There are impressive bottlenecks a program has to go through to
make nuclear weapons," Chyba said, adding that the Vienna-based Atomic
Energy Commission monitors more than 1,000 nuclear facilities around the
world.
The result is a comparatively "robust" nuclear nonproliferation
regime, he said.
The nonproliferation and deterrence strategies used for nuclear weapons
are less applicable to the biological threat. "Biological weapons
pose other challenges," Chyba said. "One of the challenges is
recognizing an attack as an attack and not a disease outbreak."
When followers of Baghwan Shree Rajneesh spread salmonella bacteria in
Oregon salad bars in 1984, "it was a year before the attack was recognized
as intentional," he said. "In some cases biological attacks
may not be recognized. Another challenge is how do you attribute attack."
The main defense against biological attack is a public health system equipped
to detect and respond to disease outbreaks not just in the United States
but around the world, according to Chyba. "Because of incubation
periods associated with biological agents, the first responders are going
to be doctors and health care providers, not police and fire."
Noting recent public discussion about U.S. preparedness for a smallpox
outbreak, Chyba said, "we need to supplement our smallpox vaccine
supply. It is in our interest to respond to smallpox outbreaks overseas.
"We need to work toward real-time surveillance of disease,"
he said. "There is not a robust world surveillance system."
Biological security will require an international effort in "prevention,
protection and response," Chyba said, adding that a political challenge
is getting nations to agree to surveillance protocols.
Other measures that should be taken include cataloging and ensuring the
security of existing stocks of biological agents, creating libraries of
relevant strains and acquiring strains or gene sequences from former Soviet
republics as part of a larger cooperative threat reduction effort.
Chyba said there’s a new biosecurity bill pending in Congress that
would provide $150 million for improving disease surveillance and response
internationally.
"There’s a skeleton of a surveillance system in place, but it
needs to be strengthened," he said.
Science and technology play a big part in biological security and Chyba
said scientists need to work closely with policymakers on technical issues.
"The U.S. government is not well positioned for science advising,"
said Chyba, a former White House Fellow. "The challenges we face
will increasingly have a technical component. Too often policymakers don’t
understand the importance of technical advice.
"The scientific community needs to get smarter about working with
policymakers. The scientific community too often punishes scientists interested
in policy. We need to revivify science advising in Washington."