Combating bioterrorism calls for a comprehensive biological security approach

The anthrax attacks last fall make it clear that the United States needs "a comprehensive approach" to biological security, said Christopher Chyba, co-director of Stanford University’s Center for International Security and Cooperation, in a Director’s Distinguished Lecturer Series presentation.

Chyba said the attacks in Tokyo by the Aum Shinrikyo cult were earlier evidence that "attempted mass biological attacks are within the realm of possibility."

Prior to the more highly publicized sarin gas attack in the Tokyo subway, the cult had attempted to spread anthrax in the city but used the wrong strain. "I don’t know if we should take comfort in that," he said, noting the perpetrators were sophisticated "but failed technically."

Chyba warned that because of the special challenges biological weapons pose, a different strategy is needed from that used to combat the threat of nuclear or chemical weapons. "Our minds are too easily captured by misplaced analogies to nuclear weapons," he said. "We tend to group the nuclear, biological and chemical."
The biological threat is, in one sense, more analogous to cyberterrorism because it is more diffuse. "There are over 100 million computers in the world with access to the Internet and the number is growing daily," Chyba said. Likewise "biological weapons materials are present in many facilities around the world. As biotechnology spreads around the world, the ability to do nefarious things will become more common. The biotechnology revolution is rolling around the world and there’s nothing that can stop that."

In contrast, nuclear weapons production requires large, complex facilities. "There are impressive bottlenecks a program has to go through to make nuclear weapons," Chyba said, adding that the Vienna-based Atomic Energy Commission monitors more than 1,000 nuclear facilities around the world.

The result is a comparatively "robust" nuclear nonproliferation regime, he said.

The nonproliferation and deterrence strategies used for nuclear weapons are less applicable to the biological threat. "Biological weapons pose other challenges," Chyba said. "One of the challenges is recognizing an attack as an attack and not a disease outbreak."

When followers of Baghwan Shree Rajneesh spread salmonella bacteria in Oregon salad bars in 1984, "it was a year before the attack was recognized as intentional," he said. "In some cases biological attacks may not be recognized. Another challenge is how do you attribute attack."

The main defense against biological attack is a public health system equipped to detect and respond to disease outbreaks not just in the United States but around the world, according to Chyba. "Because of incubation periods associated with biological agents, the first responders are going to be doctors and health care providers, not police and fire."

Noting recent public discussion about U.S. preparedness for a smallpox outbreak, Chyba said, "we need to supplement our smallpox vaccine supply. It is in our interest to respond to smallpox outbreaks overseas.
"We need to work toward real-time surveillance of disease," he said. "There is not a robust world surveillance system."

Biological security will require an international effort in "prevention, protection and response," Chyba said, adding that a political challenge is getting nations to agree to surveillance protocols.

Other measures that should be taken include cataloging and ensuring the security of existing stocks of biological agents, creating libraries of relevant strains and acquiring strains or gene sequences from former Soviet republics as part of a larger cooperative threat reduction effort.

Chyba said there’s a new biosecurity bill pending in Congress that would provide $150 million for improving disease surveillance and response internationally.

"There’s a skeleton of a surveillance system in place, but it needs to be strengthened," he said.

Science and technology play a big part in biological security and Chyba said scientists need to work closely with policymakers on technical issues.

"The U.S. government is not well positioned for science advising," said Chyba, a former White House Fellow. "The challenges we face will increasingly have a technical component. Too often policymakers don’t understand the importance of technical advice.

"The scientific community needs to get smarter about working with policymakers. The scientific community too often punishes scientists interested in policy. We need to revivify science advising in Washington."